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1  Introduction 
 
Most of the literature on the theory of taxation is based on a simple theory of taxpayers’ 
compliance: They do as they are told. If the size of the tax base as well as the tax rate is 
known, the revenue is simply the product of the two. But economists and administrators alike 
have known for a very long time that this is not strictly true. An early example of the 
awareness of the importance of tax evasion can be found in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations (Smith 1776). Among his four basic maxims or principles for the design of tax 
systems, the fourth may be of special interest in the present context: 
 
“Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets 
of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the publick 
treasury of the state.” (Smith 1776; 1976, p. 826.) 
 
Modern readers may see in this statement an early understanding of the efficiency costs of 
taxation, and Smith does in fact argue that taxes “may obstruct the industry of the people,” 
which is a central concern of the modern literature on optimal taxation. In addition, however, 
two of his reasons have to do with the costs of tax administration in ensuring tax compliance 
and prevent evasion. On the one hand there is the cost incurred by the government: The tax 
“may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the 
produce of the tax” (p. 826). On the other hand one must also take account of the cost to the 
taxpayer: “By subjecting the people to the frequent visits, and the odious examination of the 
tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression” (p. 
827). Of particular interest is his argument that  
 
“by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who 
attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them and thereby put 
an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment 
of their capitals” (p. 826). 
 
Clearly, Smith was well aware of the problems raised by tax evasion and its implications for 
the costs of tax administration. It is of particular interest to note from the last quotation that he 
realized that not only evasion itself but also the policies adopted to control it may impose 
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costs on society by increasing the gap between the private burden of taxation and government 
revenue. 
 
It spite of Smith’s attention to the problem, the interest in tax evasion gradually faded out 
from the public economics literature. In his Study in Public Finance Pigou pointed out briefly 
that under adverse circumstances “an income tax would be rendered unworkable by evasion” 
(Pigou 1928; 1947, p. 115) but did not pursue the subject any further except by noting that 
“what measure of evasion is in fact practised is a matter of controversy” – a statement that 
remains true to this day. Thirty years later, Musgrave’s famous treatise (Musgrave 1959) 
made no mention of tax evasion, and it was not until the 1970s that the subject became an 
important area of research for public economists. This was the start both of a long series of 
empirical studies and of a formalized theory, beginning with a paper on income tax evasion 
by Allingham and Sandmo 1972).1 It is natural to take my point of departure from this model 
and start in Section 2 with a brief outline of its main assumptions and results. Section 3 
discusses some interpretations and reformulations of the basic model such as its implications 
for the “extensive margin” of tax evasion, its robustness with respect to alternative 
assumptions about taxpayer preferences, and its extension to include variable labour supply 
and work in the hidden economy. Section 4 considers topics related to the evasion of taxes on 
capital and of indirect taxes, which also raises the problem of how to model tax evasion 
decisions by firms. In Section 5 we consider the tax compliance decision in a systems context 
by discussing general equilibrium effects, issues of optimal taxation and the tax 
administration perspective. Section 6 concludes with a summary of the main results and a 
brief discussion of the significance of tax evasion when judging the performance of the 
modern welfare state.  
 
This paper should be read as a survey of the issues involved in theorizing about the hidden 
economy, not as a survey of the extensive literature. Recent survey articles that include 
further references to the literature include Andreoni, Erhard and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod 
and Yitzhaki (2002) and Sandmo (2005). An excellent early exposition of the theory is 
Cowell (1990). 
 
2 Income tax evasion: The basic model 
                                                 
1 A related article by Srinivasan (1973) addressed many of the same issues but assumed risk neutrality rather 
than risk aversion on the part of the taxpayer. 
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Taxpayers have incentives to escape from the private burden of taxation either by engaging in 
avoidance or evasion activities. The distinction between the two concepts is essentially that 
tax avoidance is legal while evasion is not. An implication of this is that in the case of 
avoidance activities, such as exploiting loopholes in the tax law, it is essential for the taxpayer 
to report his transactions openly and accurately in order to make sure that he receives the 
reductions in his tax liability that he claims.2 By contrast, in the case of evasion the taxpayer 
is concerned with hiding his activities from the tax authorities. In the present paper our 
concern will be with tax evasion.  
 
The model in Allingham and Sandmo (1972) can be seen as an adaptation of a simple model 
of portfolio choice with two assets, one safe and one risky. There is an amount of true income 
which is assumed to be exogenous and unknown to the tax collector. The amount reported 
corresponds to the safe asset in portfolio theory: The tax to be paid on this amount is known 
with certainty. The amount not reported corresponds to the risky asset: With some probability 
the attempt at evasion will be discovered, in which case the taxpayer has to pay tax on this 
amount at a penalty rate which is higher than the regular tax rate, but it is also possible that 
the underreporting will not be discovered, in which case no tax will be paid. The taxpayer has 
to decide how much of his income to report and how much not to report, taking account both 
of the expected tax rate and its degree of uncertainty. He is assumed to make this choice with 
the objective of maximizing expected utility. In the simplest version of the model, after-tax 
income is the only argument in the utility function. 
 
I will not go into any analytical detail, but in order to fix ideas it may be useful to introduce a 
bit of mathematical notation. Let true income be represented by W, and let t be the statutory 
tax rate which is assumed to be constant. Further, let e be the amount not reported and θ the 
penalty rate. If the attempted evasion is not discovered, after-tax income is  
 
Y = W – t(W-e) = (1-t)W + te.     (1) 
 
In the case where the attempted evasion is discovered by the tax authority, income after tax 
becomes 
                                                 
2 However, he may attempt to bend the rules that regulate the opportunities for avoidance, thereby crossing the 
border between avoidance and evasion. 
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Z = (1-t)W + te – θe = (1-t)W – (θ-t)e.    (2) 
 
If U is the utility function of income and p is the probability of detection, expected utility can 
be written as 
 
V = (1-p)U(Y) + pU(Z).      (3) 
 
The taxpayer is assumed to be risk averse, so that the second-order derivative of U is 
negative. In addition, I shall also make the natural assumption that the measure of absolute 
risk aversion, -U’’(٠)/U’(٠), is decreasing in income; a standard assumption in the economics 
of uncertainty. The taxpayer chooses the level of e that maximizes expected utility, which is 
determined by the first order condition 
 
(1-p)U’(Y)t – pU’(Z)(θ-t) = 0.     (4) 
 
Let us first assume that e is strictly positive: The taxpayer finds that expected utility 
maximization calls for some amount of tax evasion. The optimum conditions can then be used 
to derive hypotheses about the taxpayer’s reactions to changes in the values of the exogenous 
parameters of the model, i.e. W, t, θ and p. With the assumption of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, tax evasion will be an increasing function of income. The amount of evasion will be 
a decreasing function of the parameters θ and p; deterrence can be achieved both through a 
high probability of detection and by a high penalty in the event of discovery. As regards the 
effect of the statutory tax rate, there is an ambiguity which can be expressed as a Slutsky 
decomposition into a positive substitution effect and a negative income effect: On the one 
hand, a higher tax rate creates a stronger incentive to evade taxes; on the other hand, higher 
taxation makes the taxpayer less wealthy and accordingly less prone to expose himself to risk. 
This ambiguity reflects the assumption that the tax is proportional which confounds the 
effects of the average and marginal tax rates. If instead one assumes that the tax is linear as in 
the case of the negative income tax, one could separate the two effects and conceptually 
increase the marginal rate of tax while holding the average rate constant. In that case the 
prediction would be that an increase of the marginal tax rate unambiguously increases tax 
evasion. 
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Needless to say, the model is built on a number of simplifying assumptions. In general, the 
theoretical perspective on the tax evasion decision is a very narrow one in regarding the tax 
compliance decision in complete isolation from all other economic choices made by the 
individual such as occupational choice, labour supply, saving and portfolio decisions. 
Extensions of the model in these directions will be further discussed below.  
 
It should be kept in mind that the theory is based on the assumption that discovery is 
equivalent to conviction. In real life, however, the discovery of evasion does not immediately 
translate itself into a conviction in a court of law since the court may not uphold the initial 
assessment of the amount of income evaded. Although the taxpayer may know the provisions 
in the tax law regarding the penalties attached to the amount of  income that he does not 
report, the fact that he does not know for certain what the court’s decision will be means that 
the penalty itself will be uncertain; this complication has been further discussed by Snow and 
Warren (2005).  
 
3 Further aspects and extensions of the basic model 
 
Conceptually, the amount of tax evasion undertaken can be related both to the number of 
taxpayers that engage in evasion (the extensive margin) and to the extent of non-compliance 
by the individual evader (the intensive margin). In the literature on tax evasion following the 
Allingham-Sandmo article considerable attention has been devoted to the model’s 
implications for the extensive margin and to the question of whether the expected utility 
approach adequately captures the nature of the taxpayer’s decisions. A related issue is 
whether the simple portfolio framework may be misleading in terms of understanding the 
interaction with black labour markets and the “unofficial” economy. These issues will be 
discussed below. 
 
3.1 The extensive margin 
 
Changes in the amount of tax evasion in the economy can occur both on the intensive and 
extensive margins. The individuals who engage in tax evasion may choose to report more or 
less of their actual income as their perception of the policy parameters changes, but the total 
amount of evasion may also change because the fraction of the population that evades income 
may increase or decrease. So far the analysis has been based on the assumption that the 
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individual taxpayer has decided not to report part of his income (e>0); analytically, the model 
is assumed to have an interior solution. If the taxpayer is regarded as a representative agent, 
he represents an economy in which everyone evades some tax. But the decision to become a 
tax evader ought to be part of the predictions of the model and should be derived as an 
implication of it, not stated as an assumption. However, it is in fact easy to show that for an 
interior solution to be optimal it must be the case that 
 
t > pθ.         (5) 
 
If the regular tax rate is higher than the expected penalty rate, the risk averse taxpayer will 
decide not to report some of his income. It is worth noting that this condition makes no 
reference to the taxpayer’s degree of risk aversion or more generally to his preferences. The 
extent of his underreporting, on the other hand, will obviously depend on the shape of his 
utility function and his degree of risk aversion. 
 
When interpreting this condition it should be kept in mind that the three parameters t, p and θ 
must be expected to vary across the population and to depend on the taxpayer’s income, 
profession, family status etc. However, many observers have pointed out that even when these 
complications are taken into account the inequality is likely to be satisfied for the large 
majority of taxpayers, implying that almost everyone is a tax evader. This, they argue, is 
unrealistic, so there must be some important element of reality that is missing from the model. 
 
In arguing the implausibility of condition (5), critics have mainly pointed out that it implies an 
unrealistic critical value for the probability of detection. To get a feeling for the magnitudes 
involved, suppose that θ is twice the value of t. Then the individual will become a tax evader 
if the probability of detection is less than one half. But realistic estimates of the frequency of 
audits indicate a number that is well below 0.10, so that the prediction that almost everyone 
will underreport their income seems pretty safe. Or does it? It has to be kept in mind that what 
matters for the taxpayer’s decision is not the objective frequency of audit but his subjective 
perception of what the probability of discovery is. There are in fact empirical data indicating 
that this might be much higher than the objective probability, and this might go some way 
towards explaining the otherwise apparent inconsistency between theory and observation. But 
there are also other reasons why the number of tax evaders in the population is less than may 
be suggested by condition (5) and the numerical example that was used above. 
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One such reason is that the possibility of successful evasion depends crucially on the source 
of income. In most Western countries, labour income is reported directly to the tax collecting 
agency by the employer. In that case it is pointless for the employee to underreport his income 
because he is virtually certain to be discovered: p=1. Although some workers may have 
access to additional employment in the black market economy, many have not, and this could 
account for much of the discrepancy that is claimed to exist between a literal interpretation of 
the model and the alleged fact of the relative infrequency of tax evasion.  
 
When it comes to capital income the situation is different because the opportunities for hiding 
true income from the tax collector are substantially higher than in the case of labour. 
However, at least in the countries that I know well, a good part of capital income is also 
reported from its source; this would be true of interest on bank deposits and mortgages and of 
stock dividends in publicly held companies. Even though the opportunities for successful 
evasion clearly are greater for capital than for labour income, it seems likely that for the large 
number of taxpayers whose financial assets and liabilities consist of bank deposits and 
housing mortgages they are fairly limited. My conclusion is therefore that a flexible 
interpretation of condition (4) does not necessarily justify the inference that the model 
predicts an unrealistically high share of tax evaders in the economy. (I leave aside the 
question of how many evaders there actually are; this is clearly an empirical question whose 
answer is likely to vary from one country to another.)  
 
3.2 Broadening the view of taxpayer preferences 
 
A more fundamental reason why both economists and others who are concerned with these 
issues might feel uneasy about the implications of the portfolio approach is that it gives a 
picture of the tax evasion decision which may seem too calculating and cynical.  Now there 
may be good reasons for believing that tax evaders really are calculating and cynical, but the 
objection to the theory must be taken more seriously with regard to the extensive margin. Is it 
really only their possibly exaggerated estimate of the probability of detection that prevents the 
majority of the population from becoming tax evaders? 
 
In order to provide a more convincing approach to this issue, there are two avenues that can 
be explored. One consists in broadening the perspective provided by the expected utility 
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approach through assuming more general preferences. Another is to discard the use of 
expected utility theory altogether and base the theory of tax evasion on alternative 
assumptions about taxpayer preferences. 
 
As regards the first alternative, there are at least two simple extensions of the theory that can 
provide a more convincing explanation of the condition that must be satisfied for the taxpayer 
to engage in illegal underreporting. One of these was explored in Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972): There may be a social stigma attached to the discovery of tax fraud, so that the utility 
of a given income is lower in the state of discovery. This assumption can be captured by 
writing expected utility as 
 
V = (1-p)U(Y) + pU(Z, s),      (6) 
 
where s represents the social stigma so that U depends negatively on s. The implication of this 
generalization is that, give that the state of discovery occurs, the taxpayer derives less utility 
from his after tax income than he would have done had his fraud not been discovered. An 
alternative assumption (Sandmo 2005) is that the act of underreporting gives the taxpayer a 
bad conscience, so that the amount of attempted evasion enters directly into his utility 
function3. A simple way to represent this is to write expected utility as 
 
V = (1-p)U(Y) + pU(Z) – B(e),     (7) 
 
where B(e) is the disutility or bad conscience attached to the act of underreporting. Comparing 
the formulations (6) and (7), we see that they represent different psychological assumptions 
about the preferences of the taxpayer. However, when it comes to the characterization of the 
extensive margin their implications are similar. Using (7), we can rewrite condition (5) as 
 
t > pθ + B’(0)/U’(W(1-t))).      (5’) 
 
One sees immediately that the assumption of disutility of evasion has the effect of making the 
condition for positive underreporting to be optimal more restrictive; there is a “conscience 
tax” which requires that the gap between the statutory tax rate and the expected penalty must 
                                                 
3 A version of this model was also examined by Gordon (1989). 
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be larger than in the original model; how much larger it must be depends on the taxpayer’s 
preferences. Assumption (6) leads to a similar characterization although the exact form of the 
condition will be different. Thus, both of the two alternative assumptions (6) and (7) provide 
us with an explanation why taxpayers may refrain from exploiting opportunities for tax 
evasion that are apparently profitable on the basis of a straightforward calculation of expected 
gains. It is worth emphasizing, however, that neither alternative leads to any change in the 
comparative statics predictions of the model for the case of an interior solution; the difference 
that they make relates solely to the explanation of the extensive margin of tax compliance 
behaviour. 
 
An alternative to enriching the expected utility approach is to discard this hypothesis 
altogether and adopt a different rationalization of choice under uncertainty. Thus, Bernasconi 
(1998) has explored the implications of the rank-dependent expected utility hypothesis for the 
explanation of tax evasion behaviour, and Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) have analyzed the 
implications of using prospect theory. Like the modifications of expected utility theory, this 
leaves the analysis of the intensive margin unaffected while the explanation of the extensive 
margin has to be modified in the same direction as above. Yet another assumption that makes 
only minimal assumptions about taxpayer rationality is the state preference approach that 
stems from the work of Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959). Here one simply postulates that the 
taxpayer has a preference ordering over income in the two states of discovery and non-
discovery which can be represented by the ordinal utility function 
 
V = Φ(Y, Z).         (8) 
 
In this case, the explanation of the extensive margin allows for a number of interpretations 
and can be made consistent with a wide range of empirical observations. The comparative 
statics results for the case of an interior solution are remarkably similar to those of the 
expected utility model. Thus, the Slutsky decomposition of the effect of the statutory tax rate 
has exactly the same form in the two cases: There is a positive substitution effect and a 
negative income effect. The generality of this approach is also to some degree its weakness; in 
particular, it does not distinguish conceptually between “pure” preferences and probability 
beliefs. The marginal rate of substitution between Y and Z – the slope of the indifference 
curve – reflects in part the desire for income in the two states, in part the taxpayers’ beliefs 
concerning the likelihood of the two states occurring. This weakness may make the approach 
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less appealing to the economist concerned with explaining the role played by the probability 
of detection, but the state preference approach is still of interest in providing a benchmark 
against which the expected utility hypothesis as well as other approaches may be judged.  
 
My own conclusion regarding the merits of alternative explanations of tax compliance 
behaviour is that I will continue to use the expected utility approach but with the extensions 
represented by the social stigma or the conscience tax; this seems to me to be both 
analytically simple and with considerable explanatory power. However, the ongoing study of 
people’s actual behaviour in risk-taking situations may well lead to further progress and new 
insights, so that this conclusion may have to be revised in the future. 
 
3.3 Income tax evasion and labour supply 
 
The Allingham-Sandmo portfolio model is so stylized that it is hard to decide what kind of 
economic agent the evader is and how the analysis can be related to the more standard issues 
in public finance, like the effects of taxation on labour supply and saving. It does not specify 
whether the taxpayer’s income derives from labour or capital, and although the true tax base 
has been referred to as “income” it could equally well have been interpreted as wealth and the 
tax rate as wealth taxation. In particular, this implies that the analysis provides no direct 
connection to the study of labour supply in the hidden economy, which must clearly be 
counted as a serious shortcoming of the theory. When extending it to take account of black 
market labour, however, we should not jump to the conclusion that income from labour 
constitutes the most important part of tax evasion; this remains an empirical question4. 
 
Sandmo (1981) extends the analysis of the portfolio model to cover the case of variable labour 
supply5. In this model there are two classes of taxpayers, evaders and non-evaders. The non-
evaders are individuals who have no opportunity to evade taxes. The evaders are individuals 
of the same type that was described in the portfolio model; they may or may not evade taxes, 
depending on the values of the relevant tax parameters. Thus, even the evaders may choose 
not to evade taxes; the difference between them is that while the non-evaders are honest by 
                                                 
4 For recent surveys of studies of the extent of the hidden or shadow economy see the articles by Friedrich 
Schneider (2005) and Lars P. Feld and Friedrich Schneider (2010). 
5 This issue has also been considered by Baldry (1979) and Pencavel (1979), among others. The related problem 
of tax evasion in the context of occupational choice has been studied by Pestieau and Possen (1991). 
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necessity (their probability of detection equals one) the evaders, if honest, are so by choice. In 
the following I focus on the modelling of the evaders’ behaviour. 
 
The standard textbook model of labour supply assumes that the consumer maximizes a utility 
function U(C, L) with consumption and leisure as arguments, and this is a natural starting 
point for a model of black market work. Using the notation from the portfolio model, 
consumption in the cases of non-discovery and discovery will be denoted by Y and Z, 
respectively. Expected utility can then be written as 
 
V = (1-p)U(Y, L) + pU(Z, L).      (9) 
 
The time constraint in this model is that the sum of leisure time, hours of work in the regular 
economy and hours worked in the hidden economy must equal the consumer’s time 
endowment, and this can be written as 
 
L + H + h = T, 
 
where H represents hours worked in the regular economy and h the hours supplied to the 
hidden sector. 
  
As in the portfolio model, there is a budget constraint for each of the two cases of discovery 
and non-discovery. If the wage rates of the two sectors are denoted by w and w*, respectively, 
we can write the consumption levels for the two outcomes as 
 
Y = (1-t)wH + w*h,       (10) 
 
Z = (1-t)wH + (1-θ)w*h.       (11) 
 
I shall skip the details of the conditions for utility maximization and proceed directly to a 
discussion of the comparative statics results for the case of an interior solution (the intensive 
margin). Since the present model is more general than the pure portfolio model, having more 
arguments in the utility function and more choice variables, it is to be expected that the results 
will be more complex, and this turns out to be true. Nevertheless, the results concerning the 
effects of the penalty rate and the probability of detection are quite similar to the previous 
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model. Of special interest is the prediction that the model yields concerning the effect of an 
increase in the marginal tax rate: Does it encourage work in the hidden economy? We have 
seen that the answer is ambiguous even in the portfolio model because of conflicting income 
and substitution effects. But even if we disregard income effects and focus on the substitution 
effects there emerges another type of ambiguity in the present model: The primary effect of an 
increase in the tax rate is to discourage work in the regular economy, but without further 
restrictive assumptions the model is not able to predict whether this is reflected in more work 
in the hidden economy, more leisure, or both. 
 
As regards the extensive margin, it turns out that condition (5) in the portfolio model must be 
extended to take account of the difference in wages between the regular and the hidden 
economy. The condition for some work in the hidden economy to be optimal from the 
taxpayer’s point of view is 
 
w(1-t) < w*(1-pθ).        (12) 
 
If the after-tax wage rate in the regular labour market is less that the expected after-tax wage 
in the hidden economy, the worker will supply some work to the shadow economy. One sees 
immediately that this condition is identical to (5) for the special case where the wage rates in 
the two sectors are identical, i.e. w = w*. In a broader analytical framework, it would be 
interesting to study in more detail the general equilibrium determinants of the wage gap 
between the two sectors, including the analysis of the incidence of the various policy 
parameters. 
 
It may be realistic to assume that in the majority of cases labour’s marginal productivity is 
lower in the hidden economy, so that under competitive conditions w > w*. Production is 
likely to be more capital intensive in the regular economy and this indicates that the marginal 
productivity of labour is higher there than in the hidden economy. Under this assumption it is 
interesting to note from (12) that the opportunity for tax evasion may cause the worker to 
switch some of his labour effort from the high productivity to the low productivity sector, 
involving a loss of production efficiency for the economy as a whole.   
 
Although the simultaneous analysis of labour supply and tax evasion is an interesting one and 
clearly an exercise with policy relevance, one may wonder whether it adequately captures the 
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sequential nature of taxpayer decisions. The individual who in tax year t, inspired by his 
mental vision of inequality (12), engages in work in the hidden economy may have second 
thoughts when he comes to fill in his income tax return in year t+1.  At that stage, his income 
from both types of labour in the past year is given and there is usually nothing that prevents 
him from honest reporting, even if his intention last year was to have been dishonest. In this 
situation the realistic representation of his choice process may after all be the portfolio model, 
so that the modelling of tax compliance and the hidden economy may be more complex that 
either of the two models is able to capture, calling for a dynamic sequential approach.  
 
This discussion has assumed that the decision to work in the hidden economy is one that is 
taken by a worker who acts on his own. However, for a better understanding of the structure 
of the hidden economy it may be necessary to study the case where workers and employers 
act in collusion: Workers get their wages free of tax, while employers get the benefit of lower 
wages, both in the form of evasion of the payroll tax and of lower net wage payments. How 
the gains from such a transaction get divided between the two parties to the transaction is an 
interesting problem in the theory of tax incidence which has so far received little attention. 
The incidence of the tax policy instruments will presumably depend not only on the 
elasticities of demand and supply, as in the conventional case, but also on the legal allocation 
of responsibility for tax payment between worker and employer. 
 
An interesting aspect of this problem has been studied in a recent unpublished paper by Tone 
Ognedal, who argues that some firms will benefit from the hidden economy by offering jobs 
that can easily be combined with shadow work, exploiting the workers’ need for some regular 
income in order to escape detection. She shows that this mechanism may imply misallocation 
of labour in the regular economy by leading too many workers to be employed in low-
productivity firms. Thus, tax evasion may involve a loss of productive efficiency both because 
it encourages low-productivity work in the hidden economy as well as inside the regular 
economy.  
 
4 Capital and indirect tax evasion 
 
The extensions of the basic model discussed in the previous section all focus of the decisions 
of the individual taxpayer and at least by implication on the evasion of income from labour. In 
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the present section of the paper we broaden the view to take account of the evasion of income 
from capital and of the non-compliance with indirect taxes. 
 
4.1 Wealth and capital income tax evasion 
 
In the theoretical literature, the evasion of taxes on labour income has received considerably 
more attention than the evasion of taxes on capital. It is not obvious why this should be so; as 
already noted, it is difficult to argue that capital income evasion is of less empirical 
importance. One reason may be that the dividing line between evasion and avoidance is less 
clear as regards capital income than in the case of income from labour. Another reason might 
be that the analysis is seen as too easy. The study of taxation and risk taking has, ever since 
the classic study by Domar and Musgrave (1944), been set in the context of a model of 
portfolio choice, similar in structure to the one later developed by Arrow (1974) and others 
and used for the analysis of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). On this 
background, the study of evasion of capital taxes may seem too obvious to need further 
elaboration. However, the general model may be made more specific in a number of ways, so 
that some further discussion may be in order.  
 
The simplest case to analyze in the context of the model of Section 2 is a wealth tax. If W is 
defined as real wealth and e as the amount of wealth not reported the analysis may proceed 
exactly as when the model is interpreted in terms of labour income. The evasion of capital 
income tax evasion is only slightly more complex, at least as long as the rate of return on 
wealth is assumed to be certain. Assume that utility depends on final wealth, that W is the 
amount of initial wealth and that r is the rate of return. Final wealth in the two outcomes of 
non-discovery and discovery can then be written as  
 
Y = W(1+r) – t(W-e)r = W[1+r(1-t)] + ter,    (13) 
 
Z = W(1+r) –t(W-e)r – θer = W[1+r(1-t)] – (θ-t)er.  (14) 
 
Expected utility maximization yields the first order condition 
 
(1-p)U’(Y)tr – pU’(Z)(θ-t)r = 0.     (15) 
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After factoring out r, we see that this condition has exactly the same form as (4), so that the 
comparative statics properties of the two models are essentially the same. 
 
Allowing for the rate of return on saving being uncertain also preserves the structure and 
predictions of the original portfolio model. This is hardly surprising, since this generalization 
does not introduce any new margin of choice for the taxpayer. When one allows the taxpayer 
to choose the composition of his savings portfolio, however, matters get more complicated, 
since the taxpayer can now choose the probability distribution of his future wealth both via his 
portfolio choice and through the amount of capital income evaded. Within this framework, 
there are several ways in which one can model the structure of the decision to evade taxes, but 
these alternative specifications will not be pursued any further in the present context. 
 
In recent years the international dimension of evasion of taxes on capital has become of 
increasing importance. A series of empirical studies have documented the importance of tax 
havens, but their emergence also offers interesting challenges to the economic theorist. While 
the positive economics of tax havens can to a large extent be analyzed by means of existing 
models of tax evasion, the normative problems of optimal policy choice raise some new 
issues. The core problem is the design of policies in a world of multiple jurisdictions when the 
different countries have partly conflicting interests, and this leads into the study of 
international policy coordination and international tax treaties6. 
 
4.2 Indirect tax evasion 
 
The modelling of income tax evasion relies heavily on the theory of individual decision 
making in the presence of risk aversion. The evasion of indirect taxes, on the other hand, is 
most naturally regarded as a decision made by firms, and this raises the question of how to 
model the objectives of the firm. Should they be assumed to be risk averse? Risk aversion on 
the part of firms is an assumption that does not fit well into the framework of general 
equilibrium theory, but one could still make a case for it in a situation of incomplete and 
imperfect risk markets. Both risk aversion (Marrelli 1984) and risk neutrality (Sandmo 2002) 
have been explored in the literature.  
                                                 
6 An interesting survey of the basic facts of tax havens and of the main policy issues can be found in the report of 
a committee appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chaired by my colleague Guttorm 
Schjelderup; see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009). 
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As in the case of income tax evasion, the scope for individual evasion is limited by the extent 
of third party reporting. As regards indirect taxes, this is particularly important when 
considering alternative systems for commodity taxation. As regards sales taxes, no third party 
reporting is involved. By contrast, the VAT is less vulnerable to evasion because in inter-firm 
transactions buyers and sellers have opposite interests regarding the reporting of the 
transactions for tax purposes7. 
 
A particularly case of commodity taxation that is becoming of increasing importance for 
policy purposes is that of environmental or Pigouvian taxes. If these taxes are levied on the 
emission of pollutants, there are no market transactions that can be used to identify the 
magnitude of the firm’s tax liability; instead, the tax base of the individual firm must be based 
on its own reporting or on direct government controls. In both cases there is scope for 
underreporting and evasion of taxes. This problem was first studied by Harford (1978) and 
further analyzed by Sandmo (2002) and others. One concern that one may have is that the 
existence of opportunities for tax evasion may weaken the efficiency case for environmental 
taxes. In a number of important cases, however, this turns out not to be the prediction of the 
theoretical models. The profit maximizing firm – even when risk aversion leads it to 
maximize the expected utility of profits – will set the marginal cost of reducing emissions 
equal to the Pigouvian tax rate, while the amount of evasion will be determined by a tax 
arbitrage condition by which the firm will equalize the regular tax rate to the expected penalty 
rate8. Pollution control and the control of evasion can therefore be regarded as separate policy 
objectives where the optimal policy design for each objective can be determined without 
regard for the spillover effects on the other.  
 
Another insight that emerges from this type of model concerns the equivalence of taxes and 
quotas. As taxes can be evaded, quotas can be violated, and the violations can be studied by 
the theoretical tools used in the analysis of tax evasion. In this perspective, the marginal fine 
for quota violations can be shown to have many of the properties of a tax on emissions, so that 
the difference between the two types of policy may be less than one is otherwise likely to 
infer from the literature, particularly as regards the properties of non-tradable quotas.  
 
                                                 
7 A theoretical analysis of the relative merits of VAT and sales taxes is Boadway and Sato (2009). 
8 This assumes that the penalty is non-linear in the amount of evasion with an increasing marginal rate. 
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4.3 Smuggling 
 
Smuggling can be regarded as a special case of indirect tax evasion in being an attempt to 
evade import duties and quota regulations. In fact, import duties were once much more 
important for government revenue than regular indirect taxes, primarily because the 
administrative costs were lower and the opportunities for evasion were less. Perhaps because 
of its longer history and because smuggling is a more colourful activity than tax evasion, the 
empirical work on the subject is much larger and covers a longer historical period. The 
theoretical literature, on the other hand, is of more modest proportions. Its origin goes back to 
the early 1970s which saw the publication of several related papers by Bhagwati and Hansen 
(1973), Bhagwati and  Srinivasan (1973) and others, the most important of which have been 
collected in Bhagwati (1974). These contributions are strikingly different from the tax evasion 
literature that started to develop at about the same time. There is little attempt to analyze the 
behaviour of the individual smuggler, and virtually no attempt is paid to the analysis of 
smuggling as involving choice under uncertainty. On the other hand, there is a strong focus on 
the general equilibrium effects of smuggling on relative prices and the structure of industry. 
Although some attempts (Martin and Panagariya 1984) have later been made to strengthen the 
microeconomic foundations of the theory of smuggling, the disparity between the two 
approaches to what are actually closely related problems still remains.  
   
The difference may be characteristic in a more general sense of the two fields of public 
economics and international trade. Historically, the field of international economics has had a 
much stronger focus on general equilibrium effects of trade policy, while public economics 
has paid closer attention to the effects of tax policy on individual incentives and allocative 
efficiency. As regards the particular sub-fields of tax evasion and smuggling, part of the 
difference in approach probably also stems from the fact that smuggling concerns specific 
goods, while tax evasion theory has been mostly concerned with the evasion of direct taxation 
where the links to industry structure and relative prices are less obvious.     
 
5 Systems perspectives: General equilibrium, optimal taxation and tax administration 
 
The discussion of smuggling serves as a reminder that while the main part of the theory of tax 
evasion is concerned with the individual decision to evade taxes there is an obvious need to 
extend the theory by relating individual decisions to the study of the effects of tax evasion on 
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the economy as a whole. In the present section we consider some of the broader issues that 
arise in this context. 
 
5.1 General equilibrium effects 
 
To some extent, the incidence of tax evasion and the hidden economy can be studied by 
means of the theory of tax incidence. Opportunities for tax evasion affect after tax prices in 
both commodity and factor markets, and this will have implications for output and factor use 
in different sectors of the economy and thereby for the distribution of income. This raises a 
whole set of issues that have so far received little attention in the theoretical literature. To 
illustrate, in Section 3.3 above we discussed the allocation of labour time between the regular 
and the hidden economy, taking the wage rates w and w* as exogenously given. But in a 
broader analysis one would wish to determine the wage gap between the two segments of the 
labour market as a function of the policy parameters. This is of obvious importance both for 
understanding how the market mechanism works and for the design of policy. It is also 
important to realize that the wage gap between the regular and the hidden economy is likely to 
vary between industries, so that tax evasion will be of importance for the intersectoral 
allocation of labour and for relative commodity prices. 
 
Another set of general equilibrium effects requires that we move beyond the conventional 
theory of tax incidence and study the effects of social interaction. The portfolio model and the 
various extensions of it that have been discussed so far consider the individual tax evader in 
isolation from the rest of the community. This is particularly striking in the case of the 
modelling of the notions of social stigma and bad conscience discussed in Section 3.2. 
Whether the tax evader feels stigmatized by being detected is likely to depend on how many 
others have been detected for similar violations of the tax law. Similarly, whether the taxpayer 
suffers from bad conscience in evading taxes is also likely to depend on his beliefs regarding 
the occurrence of evasion in society as a whole or in his own social reference group. It is easy 
to see that this might lead to an economy with multiple equilibria in terms of the extent of tax 
evasion and black market activities. An unstable equilibrium would be one in which an 
exogenous perturbation with regard to the number of evaders releases a process that leads 
either to a low-evasion equilibrium in which most people comply with the tax law because 
that is what most others do, or to a state where most people engage in tax evasion because that 
is what most people are perceived to do. 
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This analysis is very much in the spirit of Schelling (1978) who applies a similar line of 
reasoning to a wide range of social problems. In an area closely related to that of tax evasion 
and the hidden economy, models of this type have been applied to the study of corruption in 
an article by Andvig and Moene (1990). Their central insight is that the individual cost of 
being honest in a corrupt society is higher than in a society where most individuals are honest. 
This is why corruption may corrupt and why a large hidden economy is likely to be self-
perpetuating.   
 
5.2 Issues of optimal taxation 
 
The theory of optimal taxation is essentially about the rational tradeoff between efficiency and 
distributive justice (as reflected in the choice of a social welfare function). Most of the 
literature in the field ignores tax evasion, and it is natural to ask what happens to the results of 
optimal tax theory once the presence of tax evasion is taken seriously. The incorporation of 
tax evasion in models of optimal taxation can be carried out in a number of different ways, 
and the following discussion is by necessity quite sketchy. 
 
Intuitively, one might perhaps think that tax evasion in many cases would be good for 
efficiency. In the case of the income tax, in the absence of evasion the marginal tax rate serves 
to block some transactions between buyers and sellers of labour services that would otherwise 
have been Pareto improving. Allowing taxes to be evaded in areas like home repairs and day 
care for children in reality lowers the effective tax rate on these transactions and make these 
markets as well as related markets (such as the regular labour market) function more 
efficiently. However, such questions cannot be analyzed in a partial equilibrium context. If 
the government aims to raise a given amount of revenue in real terms, the loss of revenue 
from tax evasion must be compensated by higher taxes in other markets that normally involve 
new sources of price distortion and efficiency loss. How this compensation should optimally 
be carried out, ought to depend on the elasticity of the tax bases both in the markets that are 
especially prone to tax evasion and in other markets. Alternatively, the government might 
react to tax evasion by lowering its ambitions with regard to the raising of revenue. But this 
would involve less provision of public goods with other types of efficiency losses for the 
economy as a whole. The efficiency aspects of tax evasion and their implications for optimal 
taxation are therefore more complex than one’s immediate intuition might lead one to believe. 
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As regards distributive justice economic intuition offers less in the way of suggestions 
regarding the design of optimal taxes. If black market labour is mostly carried out by low 
income workers, e.g. the unemployed, one might argue that a low effective tax rate on their 
income is an acceptable way in which to improve the situation of the least well off in society. 
At the other end of the scale, however, if one believes that evasion is especially important for 
capital and business income, this implies that there is in fact a low tax rate on the highest 
incomes, which would have less appeal to one with egalitarian social values. 
 
A further complication arises from the fact that it is obviously artificial to analyze issues of 
optimal taxation in isolation from the choice of policies to ensure tax compliance. The issues 
discussed in the theory of optimal taxation should ideally be considered together with the 
analysis of optimal compliance policy, and this raises a challenging set of issues for the public 
finance economist. Should lower taxes on transactions where evasion is important go together 
with higher penalties and more use of resources on detection? Questions like this call for a 
more formalized approach, and efforts in this direction have been made by a number of 
authors. 
 
The theory of optimal commodity taxation characterizes optimal taxes by means of the 
Ramsey rule of equal proportional reductions in demand or, as a special case, the inverse 
elasticity rule. The validity of these rules in the presence of tax evasion has been examined by 
Cremer and Gahvari (1993) who explicitly model indirect tax evasion as an activity that is 
undertaken by profit maximizing firms. The government chooses statutory tax rates and 
probabilities of detection which both affect the expected tax rates9 that are crucial for 
evaluating the welfare effects of tax rates. For the special case of independent demands, 
Cremer and Gahvari show how tax evasion leads to a modification of the Ramsey inverse 
elasticity rule: Optimal expected tax rates are lower in markets for which evasion is 
important.10 But it should be kept in mind that the importance of evasion is endogenous in the 
model, since it depends on the choice of probability of detection. This confirms the point 
made above: Optimal taxation and compliance policies should be considered in conjunction 
                                                 
9 The expected tax rate is the weighted average of the regular tax rate and the penalty rate, using the probabilities 
of non-detection and detection as weights. 
10 This result is related to the argument more recently advanced by Feldstein (1999), Slemrod and Yitzhaki  
(2002) and Chetty (2009) that the deadweight loss from a tax can be measured by the elasticity of the tax base 
with respect to the tax, although their analysis does not use an explicit optimal taxation framework. 
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which each other; this leads to deeper insights but also to results that are not always easy to 
interpret. The Cremer-Gahvari analysis is valid for the case of a representative consumer 
economy; contributions that also incorporate distributional concerns include Chander and 
Wilde (1998) and Boadway and Sato (2000). 
 
Several authors have examined the theory of optimal income taxation in the presence of tax 
evasion. Sandmo (1981) showed how evasion leads to modifications of the characterization of 
the marginal tax rate in the case of a linear income tax; however, the analysis did not lead to 
any firm conclusion as to whether the marginal tax rate should be higher or lower in the 
presence of evasion. This agnostic conclusion has also been confirmed in the later and more 
general study of Cremer and Gahvari (1996). In the light of the general discussion above, this 
ambiguity was to be expected; the joint analysis of tax design and compliance policy is too 
complex to result in simple and intuitive characterizations. 
 
It should be emphasized that once one takes account of the distributive aspects of the hidden 
economy, there may be moral objections to tax evasion that are not adequately captured by 
the “welfarist” approach that treats individual utility of honest and dishonest taxpayers on an 
equal footing. Judgements about just or fair distribution of income and resources may be 
based not only on the outcomes for individuals in society but also the process by which the 
outcomes have been brought about.    
 
5.3 The tax administration perspective 
 
In the public finance literature, the concept of the costs of taxation usually refer to the costs of 
distortion of the set of competitive prices, while the more concrete costs of administering the 
price system are typically neglected, at least in the context of formal economic models. As 
emphasized e.g. by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) the cost of administration is a crucial 
component in judging the feasibility and efficiency of alternative tax systems. Such 
judgements are likely to vary substantially over time and between countries; as always, what 
theory can contribute is a general framework for discussion and analysis. 
 
A substantial part of the administrative costs of the tax system is the cost of ensuring 
compliance. The theory of tax evasion has laid the framework for thinking about ensuring 
compliance via the cost of detection, the use of penalties and the design of the regular tax 
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system. Different tax systems offer different opportunities for evasion, so that the choice of an 
optimal tax system should take account of the evasion activities that each system is likely to 
encourage. As shown in the discussion of the principles of optimal taxation above, if optimal 
tax rules are to be interpreted in terms of the elasticities of the different tax bases, one must 
take account of the fact that governments can not only choose tax rates but to some extent also 
the elasticities; a point emphasized by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). This follows from the 
insight that these reflect the opportunities for evasion which can be affected by government 
policy with regard to the magnitude of penalties and the resources spent on increasing the 
probabilities of detection. 
 
The theory of tax evasion does not capture every aspect of the administrative costs of the tax 
system. E.g., a highly differentiated set of commodity taxes is likely to involve higher 
accounting costs than a system of uniform rates and the cost is likely to depend on the number 
of different rates rather than on their magnitudes. This may give rise to non-convex costs of 
administration which are difficult to analyze in formal optimization models. On the other 
hand, a highly differentiated set of tax rates may itself offer greater scope for tax evasion by 
the opportunities it offers for misrepresenting the true tax base. 
 
A highly complex tax system, involving a differentiated system of tax rates and tax 
deductions, may also cause the taxpayer to pay more in taxes than required by the tax law. In 
other words, individual tax evasion may be negative. This case has received little attention in 
the literature, presumably because it is of minor empirical importance. Nevertheless, excess 
compliance may be a real issue in judging the distributive impact of complex tax systems. 
 
6 Concluding remarks: The welfare state  
 
The literature on tax evasion has undoubtedly added some important perspectives to the 
theoretical literature on public economics, and the present paper is an attempt to provide a 
survey of the main issues that the literature has emphasized. A focal point of the theory is the 
modelling of the tax evasion (or tax compliance) decision as an example of choice under 
uncertainty. We have seen how expected utility theory can be used to predict the responses of 
the taxpayer to changes in tax rates and penalties and to illuminate the crucial role of penalties 
and the probability of detection in determining the choice of whether or not to become a tax 
evader. We have also seen how the latter decision can be sensitive to the exact assumptions 
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made about the taxpayer’s preferences, in particular to the role of moral concerns. It has 
further been demonstrated how the theory can be extended to take account of labour supply 
decisions, the evasion of taxes on wealth and income from capital as well as indirect tax 
evasion, including smuggling. Individual decisions about tax compliance affect the 
performance of the whole economic system, and we have seen how general equilibrium 
effects may appear both as conventional incidence effects and as the effects of social 
interaction. Tax compliance and evasion also lead to modifications of the characterization of 
optimal income and commodity taxes. Finally, it has been pointed out that the cost of ensuring 
tax compliance is an important component of the cost of tax administration, a concept that the 
theory of public finance at least until recently has found it difficult to come to grips with. 
 
This set of modifications to the theory of public finance has important consequences for the 
analysis of public policy in the modern welfare state. Notions of the welfare state differ, but 
most economists would agree that the welfare state combines a concern for efficiency and 
economic growth with egalitarian values related to distributive justice (however defined) and 
economic security. Of the policies used to implement the aims of the welfare state, the tax 
system occupies a place of primary importance. A large public sector requires a high overall 
level of taxes, so that widespread evasion contributes to the erosion of the financial basis for 
the welfare state. Moreover, the income tax in particular is designed to ensure that the cost of 
welfare state policy gets distributed among individuals and socioeconomic groups in a way 
that is socially acceptable. Tax evasion implies that the real structure of the tax system differs 
from its design. When the tax base shrinks because of evasion tax rates must be set higher 
than otherwise in order to finance welfare state expenditure. And if the income tax base is 
distorted, e.g. so as to let the receivers of capital income escape from taxation, the tax 
becomes less progressive and less redistributive than legislators had intended.  
 
These issues go beyond the purely economic considerations of targeting policies to social 
objectives. To be a sustainable social and economic system, the welfare state requires social 
legitimacy among the general public and the electorate. If many taxpayers perceive that they 
bear an unreasonably high share of the tax burden compared with individuals who obviously 
earn a much higher income than they do themselves, the political support for the welfare state 
is likely to diminish, particularly if it is believed that politicians fail to act against better 
knowledge. Admittedly, there are those that are sceptical to the welfare state, e.g. in its 
Scandinavian version. But even they would presumably agree that if the welfare state is to be 
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rolled back, it would be preferable if it happened through explicit political decisions rather 
than as side effects of growth of the hidden economy. 
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